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BURSEY v. UNITED STATES: THE FIRST
AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS IN
THE GRAND JURY ROOM
On November 15, 1969, David Hilliard, Chief of Staff of the
Black Panther Party, addressed a Moratorium Day rally against the war
in San Francisco and received national notoriety when he proclaimed
to the large crowd, "We will kill Richard Nixon." As a result of that
speech, a federal grand jury began investigations into a possible plot
to assassinate the President of the United States. It immediately fo-
cused its attention on the Black Panther Newspaper, which had re-
printed the entire Hilliard speech in two separate issues on other occa-
sions and had highlighted articles supporting its sentiments. In addi-
tion, on May 2, 1970, the paper printed an article by Eldridge Cleaver
entitled "To My Black Brothers in Viet Nam," in which he urged black
soldiers to kill "the racist pigs . . .giving you orders." 1  Attempting
to discover the role of the newspaper's staff in the alleged plot, the
grand jury subpoenaed two employees of the paper.
These employees, Sherrie Bursey and Brenda Joyce Presley, ap-
peared before the grand jury five different times over a peiod of ten
months, fielding questions about the inner operations of the Black
Panther Newspaper. The witnesses answered all questions except those
requiring identification of the newspaper's personnel and information
on the activities and overseas travels of certain party members.2 In
attempting to compel answers to these questions, the United States
1. This reference to the Cleaver article is given only as background informa-
tion. When the article was printed in the Black Panther Newspaper on May 2, 1970,
the grand jury used it as a basis for expanding its investigation to include 18 U.S.C.
§ 2387 (interference with the armed forces). However, the focal point of the grand
jury probe was Hilliard's speech and the potential threat it posed. Consequently, in
the ensuing discussion of matters arising out of the grand jury investigation reference
will only be made to Hilliard's speech and not to Cleaver's article.
2. The questions here in dispute are those addressed to the witnesses at the
September 10, 1970 session. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (9th
Cir. 1972). The disputed questions are those asked the witnesses at the September
10, 1970 session. Several of them had been put to the witnesses at prior sessions of
the grand jury and had been answered. For example, question number 21 (Bursey)
was answered at the June 4, 1970 session and questions number 23 and number 24
(Presley) were answered at the May 13, 1970 session. This fact gave rise to the an-
cillary issue of whether the witnesses could review their past grand jury testimony to
aid them in determining what questions they had already answered and to what ex-
tent they had answered them. This point is not discussed herein but can be re-
[915]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Attorney conducting the investigation submitted an application to the
federal district court, requesting a grant of immunity for the witnesses
in accordance with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.1 The court, in granting the request, instructed the witnesses
to answer all questions relevant to the investigation, but, even under
threat of contempt, they still refused. At the resulting contempt hear-
ing, the witnesses argued that the questions they were required to
answer violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Nevertheless,
Bursey and Presley were cited for contempt and the case of Bursey v.
United States' is an appeal from that order.
The issues emanating from the appeal raise certain questions about
the scope and power of the First and Fifth Amendment privileges in
the United States Constitution.5 Specifically, they deal with (1) the
comprehensiveness of the Omnibus Crime Control Act's immunity stat-
ute and (2) the scope of the First Amendment in a grand jury pro-
ceeding. This note will first examine the different approaches used by
various courts in interpreting immunity statutes and list the reasons
for preferring the Bursey court's approach. Second, the court's dis-
position of the First Amendment issue will be analyzed in terms of its
basic weaknesses and the recent United States Supreme Court decision
of Branzburg v. Hayes.6
searched in such cases as In re Bonanno, 344 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1965) (witness re-
viewing another witness' testimony); In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(witness reviewing his own testimony); United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defendant seeking testimony for his defense preparation). For a
general discussion of the subject, see Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Se-
crecy, 1 JOHN MARSH. J. PRAC. & PROC. 18 (1967).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970) reads in pertinent part: "Whenever in the judg-
ment of a United States attorney the testimony of any witness ... in any case or
proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United States involving any viola-
tion of this chapter or any of the offenses enumerated in section 2516, or any con-
spiracy to violate this chapter or any of the offenses enumerated in section 2516 is
necessary to the public interest, such United States attorney, upon the approval of the
Attorney General, shall make application to the court that the witness shall be in-
structed to testify ... and upon order of the court such witness shall not be ex-
cused from testifying ... on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of
him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. No such
witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled ... to testify
4. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
5. One other issue in the case, not discussed in this note, involved due process.
The due process issue resulted from the contempt citation being issued to include
certain questions which had been answered by the witnesses in previous grand jury
sessions (see note 2 supra) and certain questions which had been expressly excluded
from the grant of immunity. The court ruled that the witnesses could not be held
in contempt for refusal to answer these questions. Id. at 1079-81.
6. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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The Scope of Immunity
Under 18 U.S.C. section 25147 immunity can be granted to a
witness testifying "in any case or proceeding before any grand jury
or court of the United States involving any violation of. . . any of the
offenses enumerated in section 2516,8 or any conspiracy to violate...
any of the offenses enumerated in section 2516. . ."I In the grand
jury's investigation, only one of the five statutes1" involved in the
probe-18 U.S.C. section 1751 dealing with presidential assassination,
kidnapping, and assault-was listed in section 2516; it was solely on
the basis of that statute that immunity was requested and granted.
With that fact in mind, Bursey and Presley contended that the only
questions they should be required to answer were those dealing directly
with the subject matter of section 1751 since their immunity extended
only that far.'1 On the other hand, the government argued that, once
they had been immunized under section 2514, -the witnesses were im-
munized as to any and all inquiries put to them by the grand jury..2
The court rejected both of these formulas, advancing a third
which required that before a witness can be compelled to answer a
disputed interrogatory, that interrogatory must be relevant to the sub-
ject matter for which the witness was granted immunity.13  Under this
7. This confers so-called transactional immunity which prevents a witness from
being prosecuted for the crimes concerning which he testified. For a view into the
development of this statute, see Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892); In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See generally S. REP. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and
Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 lists numerous statutes through which the immunity statute (section
2514) can be invoked. In the vast majority of investigations employing section 2514,
one or more of the statutes listed in section 2516(c) is involved. Such is the case in
JBursey. Some of the most commonly investigated statutes in subsection (c) are
18 U.S.C. §§ 224 (bribery in sporting contests), 1084 (transmission of wagering in-
formation), 1751 (presidential assassination, kidnapping, or assault), 1952 (interstate
racketeering), 2314 and 2315 (interstate transportation of stolen property).
9. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2514
(1970).
10. The grand jury investigation included 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 (general aiding and
abetting statute), 371 (general conspiracy statute), 871 (threats against President and
successors to the Presidency), 1751 (presidential assassination, kidnapping, and as-
sault), and 2387 (interference with armed forces--see note 1 supra).
11. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 1972).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1073-76. The difference between appellants' approach and that
adopted by the court is one of emphasis. That is, appellants' approach would re-
quire the court to set firm limits on the grand jury as to what it could and could not
ask appellants. Such a suggestion is contrary to long-standing grand jury procedures:
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approach, the relevance of the question was determined by whether
it fit within the limits of the immunity statute and not the scope of the
grand jury's investigation. In applying this concept to the situation in
Bursey, the court said:
We assume that all of the questions that the witnesses refused to
answer were relevant to possible offenses which the grand jury
might properly investigate. The issue is, however, were the ques-
tions relevant to an investigation of possible violations of section
175 1?1
The popularity of this approach to the interpretation of immunity
statutes is by no means universal. 5 The Third Circuit developed a
formula which places emphasis on whether the disputed interrogatory
comes within the ambit of the grand jury investigation rather than the
subject matter of the immunity statute. This approach began its de-
velopment with Marcus v. United States,16 a case arising out of a grand
jury probe into possible violations of federal gambling and racketeering
statutes and the Federal Communications Act.
Marcus, who had been immunized under the immunity statute in
the Federal Communications Act,' alleged that since his immunity
extended only to violations of that act, he could not be required to an-
swer questions dealing with violations of the other statutes. In deny-
ing this allegation, the court first noted that all the questions, though
dealing with gambling and racketeering violations, were linked to the
Federal Communications Act' and thus were covered by the immunity
"It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope
of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly." Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
282 (1919); see generally Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 590 (1961). On the other hand, the court's approach does not interfere with
the grand jury process until a witness has refused to answer and the court is called
upon to compel those answers.
14. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1077 (9th Cir. 1972).
15. Cases utilizing a different approach are: In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); In re Giancana, 352 F.2d 921
(7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Testa, 326 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 931 (1964); Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 372 U.S. 944 (1963); In re Lane, 224 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
16. 310 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1962).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 409(l) (repealed 1970) reads in pertinent part: "No person
shall be excused from attending and testifying . . . in any cause or proceeding, crimi-
nal or otherwise, based upon or growing out of any alleged violation of this chapter
. . . on the ground or for the reason that the testimony . . . required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture."
18. The "link" between the Federal Communications Act and 18 U.S.C. § 1084
and other gambling and racketeering statutes is that when one conducts illegal business
over the telephone (such as transmitting wagering information), he causes the tele-
phone company to violate the law, i.e., a provision in its tariff prohibits the phone
company from allowing its phones to be used for illegal purposes, and, under the
Federal Communications Act, it is against the law to cause the phone company to
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statute. The court went on to intimate, however, that the effectiveness
of the immunity was not limited to those questions linked to the Fed-
eral Communications Act. In broad language the court asserted that
the reference in the immunity statute to violations of the Federal Com-
munications Act "limits only the class of witnesses to whom the im-
munity will attach, not the scope of the immunity conferred '19 and,
further, that "the immunity is as extensive as the testimony.
20
Despite this broad language, there is some confusion as to what
Marcus actually says. The fact that all the disputed interrogatories
fell within the subject matter of the immunity statute has caused some
courts to cite Marcus as authority for requiring all interrogatories to
come within the purview of the applicable immunity statute.' Never-
theless, subsequent Third Circuit cases building upon Marcus clearly
indicate that it is to be read as requiring only that disputed questions
fit within the scope of the grand jury investigation.
In United States v. Testa,22 the Third Circuit began to clarify the
Marcus decision. The factual situation in that case was almost identi-
cal to Marcus, with the grand jury investigating gambling and rack-
eteering operations by utilizing the immunity statute of the Federal
Communications Act. The opinion is only a short per curiam state-
ment requiring the appellant to answer all questions and citing Marcus as
authority for that order. The dissent, however, provides some insight
into the extensiveness of the opinion and the broad reading given to
Marcus by the court. In asserting support for the Marcus decision, the
dissent explained the essential difference between that case and Testa:
In Marcus . . . we were evidently satisfied that the nature of the
questions left no doubt as to the object of the inquiry. The in-
stant case falls far short of Marcus in this report.
Further, it is not clear by any means how the Federal Com-
munications Act is here involved.
23
If the dissenting opinion accurately represented the nature of the dis-
puted questions, then the court's opinion compelled answers to ques-
tions within the scope of the grand jury's investigation with but a ten-
uous relation to the Federal Communications Act." That this is an
violate the law. United States v. Testa, 326 F.2d 730, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1963) (Kalod-
ner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 931 (1964).
19. Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 944 (1963), quoting Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 47 (1959).
20. Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d at 146-47.
21. United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds,
382 U.S. 162 (1965); United States v. Testa, 326 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1963) cert. denied
376 U.S. 931 (1964) (Kalodner, J., dissenting).
22. 326 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1963).
23. Id. at 733 (Kalodner, J., dissenting).
24. Judge Kalodner said: "In this case, the questions put to the appellant were
not self-revealing; he was asked whether he owned, rented or visited a summer place
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accurate representation of the case can be seen in a 1971 Third Circuit
case which clearly enunciated the dominating attitude in the Third Cir-
cuit.
That case, In re Grumbles,25 brought into dispute 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2514,26 the immunity statute of the Omnibus Crime Control Act.
Implementation of this section requires that one of the statutes listed
in 18 U.S.C. section 251627 be under investigation. Appellants con-
tended that no such statutes were involved in the grand jury's inquiry,
but to the extent that a particular statute was, they were only immu-
nized as to the questions dealing with that crime. The court reviewed
the disputed questions and determined that (1) they "appear[ed] to
extend to possible violations of 18 U.S.C. § 793, ' 28 a statute listed in
section 2516, and (2) the immunity thus granted under section 2514
was not restricted to questions falling within the subject matter of sec-
tion 793:
Once the Grumbles are granted immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2514, they obtain full immunity as to everything arising out of
that inquiry, including acts which might constitute a violation of
other statutes under investigation. 29
The court then quoted Marcus: "The immunity is as extensive as the
testimony."3
As in the Marcus and Testa cases, the court in Grumbles used the
scope of the grand jury investigation rather than the expressed limits
of the immunity statute to determine the relevance of the disputed in-
terrogatories. The practical effect of this approach is to extend the
in New Jersey, whether he made certain specific calls to specific numbers, and, as to
some, whom he spoke to and the purpose. Nothing is apparent from these questions,
least of all that they concerned any alleged violation of the Federal Communications
Act, as in Marcus.
"I have two reservations which are, to me, stumbling blocks to the acceptance of
our conclusion in this case. First, unlike Marcus, the questions here involved do not
in any way whatsoever show any alleged violation of the Federal Communications
Act. And the mere use of a telephone for interstate communication does not,
ipso facto, involve that Act. Second, if the Government is here suggesting that an
illegal conversation over the telephone . . . puts the telephone company in violation of
its tariff so that the user is in violation . . - then the Government is going beyond
Marcus, or any other case I have been able to find, and a new issue is presented not
reached by our Marcus decision." Id. at 732, 734.
25. 453 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1971).
26. See note 3 supra.
27. See note 8 supra.
28. In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
932 (1972).
29. Id. at 122.
30. Id. quoting Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1962).
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coverage of an immunity statute far beyond its subject matter. 1  A
partial justification for such extensions can be found in the language
of the statutes themselves which purport to apply to any proceeding
"involving" certain specific statutes or to any proceeding "growing out
of" a particular statute.82 The immunity statute applies to the pro-
ceeding, and a proceeding "growing out of" the possible violation of
a particular statute can grow to encompass the investigation of possible
violations of other, perhaps unrelated, statutes.
This approach to immunity statutes is not confined to the Third
Circuit but may be found in other jurisdictions as well. 3 The Sev-
enth Circuit case of In re Giancana34 granted immunity under the
Federal Communications Act "to any transaction, matter or thing as to
which appellant might be interrogated before the grand jury,"35 even
though the Federal Communications Act was only one of several stat-
utes under investigation by the grand jury. An Illinois federal dis-
trict court held in In re Lane3 6 that the immunity statute under the
Federal Communications Act gave the appellant "an immunity which
will extend to any crime whatsoever which she testifies to or about."
37
The Second Circuit, in such cases as United States v. Harris8 and
United States v. Tramunti,3 9 has also incorporated elements of the
Third Circuit approach into its decisions.40  In Harris, where the fac-
31. "Subject matter" is here used in its strict sense to mean the subject matter
of the chapter within which the immunity statute is located. For example, the sub-
ject matter of 47 U.S.C. § 409(l) would be all matters contained within the Federal
Communications Act but no more.
32. Another phrase often present in immunity statutes and used by courts to
give them a broad reading is the phrase which grants immunity "for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which [the witness] is compelled . . . to
testify." 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (repealed 1970). For the effects that such language
has on the courts, see Kastigar v. United States, 408 U.S. 931 (1972); Reina v
United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
33. In re Giancana, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965); In re Lane, 224 F. Supp. 317
(N.D. Ill. 1963); cf. United States v. Neiberger, 460 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1972); In re
Russo, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
34. 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965).
35. Id. at 924 n.5.
36. 224 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
37. Id. at 318.
38. 334 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
39. 343 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds sub. nom. Castaldi v.
United States, 384 U.S. 886 (1966).
40. The Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have also shown an inclination to
follow the Third Circuit. There are, however, no cases directly in point. Cf. United
States v. Neiberger, 460 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1972); In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369 (9th
Cir. 1971); Licata v. United States, 429 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 400 U.S. 938 (1970); Wirtz v. Robb, 346 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Coplon, 339 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1964).
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tual situation was very similar to that in Marcus,41 the court cited Mar-
cus with favor 2 and required the appellant to answer all disputed
questions. Unlike Marcus, however, the Harris court based its deci-
sion on the relevance of the questions to the immunity statute.4" The
court said that the "immunity extends to all testimony thus compelled
insofar as that testimony bears a substantial relation to the subject
matter of the immunity provision. 41 4  In Tramunti, the witness refused
to answer questions dealing with gambling offenses because his immu-
nity extended only to narcotics violations.4 5 Basing its decision on the
"substantial relation ' 4 6 doctrine as stated in Harris, the court ordered
the appellant to answer all of the questions, stating that gambling is
related to narcotics as a possible means of securing money to pur-
chase narcotics. This "substantial relation" between narcotics and
gambling, however, could be applied to narcotics and numerous other
federal offenses; it thus seems probable that such a test would yield
the same result as in similar cases heard in the Third Circuit.
Despite the results of some of its cases, however, the Second Cir-
cuit requires the showing of a substantial relation between the dis-
puted interrogatories and the subject matter of the immunity statute,
4 7
41. In both Harris and Marcus, all of the disputed interrogatories fell within
the subject matter of the immunity statute.
42. Harris v. United States, 334 F.2d 460, 463 (2d Cir. 1964).
43. Id. at 462.
44. Id.
45. Immunity was granted under 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (repealed 1970) which read
in pertinent part: "Whenever in the judgment of the United States attorney the testi-
mony of any witness . . . in any case or proceeding before any grand jury or court
of the United States involving any violation of-
(1) any provision of part I or part II of subchapter A of chapter 39 of the
Internal Revenue Code ....
(2) subsection (c), (h), or (i) of section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs Import and
Export Act, as amended (21 U.S.C., sec. 174), or
(3) [21 U.S.C. § 184a],
is necessary to the public interest, he, upon the approval of the Attorney General,
shall make application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify . . .
and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused from testifying . . . on
the ground that the testimony . . may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture."
46. This formula for defining the scope of an immunity statute is usually stated
in words to this effect: "the immunity extends to all testimony thus compelled
insofar as that testimony bears a substantial relation to the subject matter of the
immunity provision." United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460, 462 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd
on other grounds, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (emphasis added). For an explanation of this
doctrine, see In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631, 637 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
47. This was most recently seen in the Second Circuit case of In re Vericker,
446 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1971), where the government was denied its request for im-
munity under 18 U.S.C. § 2514 because the subject matter of the questions (stolen
F.B.I. documents) did not bear a substantial relation to the subject matter of the statute
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an approach very similar to that used by the Bursey court. Harris
and Tramunti illustrate the similarity of results which occur in the prac-
tical application of the Third Circuit approach and the Bursey ap-
proach,48 and in most cases both views allow the grand jury wide lati-
tude within certain nebulous boundaries. 49  Only when the grand jury's
investigation far outstrips its originally stated objectives do the distinc-
tions between the two views become important.
In situations, such as Bursey,50 the more restrictive nature of the
Bursey approach becomes apparent.51 The Ninth Circuit's demand
that the government show a relationship between the questions pro-
pounded and the statutory subject matter of the immunity grant allows
it to work more in the best interests of both government and witnesses
than does the Third Circuit's approach. The government is given some
protection against unwittingly extending immunity to someone it has
already decided to prosecute. 2 On the other hand, a witness may be
spared the "embarrassment, infamy, or reprisal" attaching to some
who testify before a grand jury.53
The First Amendment Questions
Of the questions held to be under the aegis of the immunity
grant,54 all threatened to infringe the witnesses' First Amendment guar-
under investigation, section 2314, in that the documents were not items with a
worth of $5,000 or more ordinarily bought and sold in interstate commerce. Id. at
247; cf. United States v. Pappadio, 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965).
48. On a motion for rehearing of the Bursey case, Judge Hufstedler (author
of the Bursey opinion) pointed out that the Third Circuit approach was based almost
entirely on its interpretations of 47 U.S.C. § 409(1) of the Federal Communications
Act and that it probably would not construe 18 U.S.C. § 2514 in the same manner,
implying, at least, that the two views are not as divergent as they might seem.
Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1091 (9th Cir. 1972). But see In re
Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1971).
49. Compare Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 935 (1970), with In re Giancana, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965).
50. In Bursey, the grand jury investigation began as a probe into a possible con-
spiracy to kill the president and expanded into a concurrent investigation of alleged
attempts to interfere with the operations of the military. Bursey v. United States,
466 F.2d 1059, 1077 (9th Cir. 1972).
51. Compare In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1971) with In re Lane,
224 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
52. Cf. United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
53. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
54. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 1972). The
court found fifteen of the questions irrelevant to the subject matter of the immunity
grant. Of these fifteen, four concerned the overseas travels of various Panthers,
five dealt with the Cleaver article, and one with possible plans to assassinate state and
federal judges. Another five questions, dealing with both the Hilliard speech and the
Cleaver article, were adjudged irrelevant until such time as they were restructured to
eliminate the reference to the Cleaver article.
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antees. For the purpose of analyzing these infringements, the Bursey
court categorized the questions into those relating substantially to the
right of freedom of association and those relating substantially to the
right of freedom of the press. Though it asserted that all of the dis-
puted questions cut to some extent into freedom of association,55 the
court analyzed only five from that perspective. 6 The majority of the
remaining questions were discussed in terms of their infringements
upon the witnesses' rights to freedom of the press.5"
The court's analysis of the problem in this manner is both able
and expert. Nevertheless, in light of the recent United States Supreme
Court case of Branzburg v. Hayes1 and its possible effect on future
cases similar to Bursey, this portion of the note will discuss the possi-
bility of avoiding the Branzburg effects by applying the law under
freedom of association to all the disputed questions, instead of just five.
The first subsection will be a critical analysis of the court's disposition
of the five questions under the associational privacy doctrine."9 The
55. Id. at 1085. "Inquiries about the identity of persons with whom the wit-
nesses were associated on the newspaper and in the Black Panther Party (Bursey
questions 1-24; Presley questions 1-14, 27-31) infringed the right of associational
privacy." As to the remaining thirteen questions, the court said "Presley questions
15-17, 26, 27 concerning possession of firearms, guerrilla training, etc., and Presley
questions 18-25 concerning conversations about weapons and threats peripherally af-
fect freedom of expression and association." Id. at 1086 n.20.
56. Id. at 1086-87. The five questions were as follows: "21. Name the mem-
bers of the Black Panther Central Committee." (asked of Bursey); "28. Do any
funds which are used for travel by Party leaders come from any foreign government?
29. Do you know whether any of the funds used for travel by Party leaders come
from any foreign government? 30. Do you know whether any Black Panthers have
been in contact with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Front or the Al Fatah
movement? 31. Have any Black Panthers contacted the Palestine Liberation Front or
the Al Fatah movement in connection with getting guerrilla training?" (All asked of
Presley). Id. at 1069-70.
57. Id. at 1087-88. Four questions (Bursey 22-24, dealing with the overseas
travels of Party members, and Presley 27, probing the Party's travel fund) were
placed in "a class by themselves." The court declared them too broad and declined
to require Bursey and Presley to answer them. The court viewed these questions as
analogous to questions infringing associational privacy. "To require a member of an
association, especially a dissident political party, to reveal the details of its funding is
as effective a chilling device as is compulsory disclosure of its membership lists."
Id. at 1088.
58. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg was a trilogy of cases involving news
gatherers who were called upon by grand juries to reveal the sources of information
they had gathered. As will be developed later in the text, the broad but purposeful
language of Mr. Justice White (author of the Branzburg opinion) effectively elimi-
nated any remnants of what has been termed the "newsman's privilege" to maintain
the confidentiality of his sources. For previous cases on this "privilege" see note 90
inf ra.
59. The associational privacy "doctrine" is formulated from several United
States Supreme Court cases dealing with invasion of one's right to freedom of associa-
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second subsection will deal with the weaknesses inherent in Bursey's re-
liance on the freedom of the press doctrine" and the possible ad-
vantages of replacing it with the freedom of association doctrine.
Freedom of Association
In passing on those questions infringing the witnesses' rights to as-
sociational privacy, the court constructed an equation by which the
needs of the government could be balanced against the infringement
of the witnesses' First Amendment rights.61 The equation, developed
from past United States Supreme Court decisions on freedom of asso-
ciation, required the government to show that:
[its] interest in the subject matter of the investigation is "imme-
diate, substantial, and subordinating" [and] that there is a "sub-
stantial connection" between the information it seeks to have the
tion. In demonstrating a solicitous attitude towards this freedom, the Court has
nevertheless carefully delineated the issues in those cases so that no one case or
group of cases sets down a comprehensive statement of the "doctrine" of associational
privacy. For purposes of this note and its discussion of the rights of an investigatory
body to invade an individual's rights of association, the doctrine has been constructed
from cases involving the public divulgence of an organization's membership list, e.g.,
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) and N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), cases dealing with investigative committees and associa-
tional privacy, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966) and Gibson
v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963), and cases concern-
ing statements of affiliations, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) and Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
60. Perhaps even more than the concept of freedom of association (see note 59
supra), freedom of the press has been very carefully separated by the United States
Supreme Court into numerous categories. There are definite pronouncements by the
Court concerning reporting of trials (Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) ), at-
tempts to influence judicial decisions (Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947)), access
to privileged information (Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965)), payment of special
taxes (Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)), regulation under the
National Labor Relations Act (Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937) ),
libel (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), and confidentiality of
sources (Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) ). Freedom of the press for the
Bursey court, however, was composed of decisions from two other categories of this
concept. The court viewed the problem as infringements on the right to publish and
distribute literature freely, and proceeded to analyze the issues in light of cases dealing
with those areas. For cases dealing with publication see, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Avins v.
Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967). For cases dealing with distribution, see, e.g.,
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
61. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972).
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witness compelled to supply and the overriding governmental in-
terest in the subject matter of the investigation. .... 62
In explaining this approach, Bursey pointed out that the government
need not establish that the testimony it desires will reveal criminal ac-
tivity, "[h]owever, it is obliged to show that there is a substantial pos-
sibility that the information sought will expose criminal activity within
the compelling subject matter of the investigation. '6 3  Consequently,
not only must the subject matter of the investigation be compelling
and of an immediate, substantial, and subordinating interest to the gov-
ernment, but so too must be the subject matter of all the disputed ques-
tions.
Applying this formula, the Bursey court ruled that the govern-
ment had successfully met its burden as to the five questions raising
associational privacy objections. One of these questions asked for the
names of the members of the Black Panther Party Central Committee."
The court allowed this infringement of the witnesses' associational
rights, reasoning that if Hilliard was referring to a group of conspira-
tors when he said "we will kill Richard Nixon," that group may have
been the party leaders, the ones with whom he was most likely to have
been in close contact. 5
It seems equally probable, however, that Hilliard would also have
been in close contact with the editors of the paper. Bursey's testimony
revealed that the paper was the voice of the party, explaining to the
public the party's programs and policies. 6 Several of the better known
party members, including Hilliard himself, worked on the paper. 7 Hil-
liard's association with the newspaper's staff makes it just as likely that
his alleged plot was hatched with them as with the Party's Central
Committee. By allowing the names of the central committee to be
released because "Hilliard would be likely to have had close commu-
nications"68 with them is similarly to allow disclosure of the names of
those on the newspaper staff, or those on any committee or in any
other capacity with whom Hilliard could be shown to have associ-
ated. Such reasoning seems tantamount to allowing the government
something approaching a membership list of the Black Panther Party.
Based on past United States Supreme Court decisions, this would be
an unjustified infringement on freedom of association.6
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
65. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1086 (9th Cir. 1972) (emphasis
added).
66. Id. at 1068.
67. Id. at 1067.
68. Id. at 1086.
69. See note 59 & accompanying text supra.
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A landmark case on this point was N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson.70  In that case, the N.A.A.C.P. became embroiled in
litigation with the state of Alabama which was trying to oust the or-
ganization for failure to comply with the conditions of a state statute
regulating the business activities of foreign corporations. During the
litigation, the N.A.A.C.P. was ordered to produce its state membership
list, which it refused to do. Instead, it submitted the proper docu-
ments and paper work to bring itself into full compliance with the
foreign corporations statute. The N.A.A.C.P. was fined $100,000 by
the court for failure to produce the membership list but won a reversal
before the United States Supreme Court. The Court was persuaded
by the organization's argument that physical, economic, and social re-
prisals could be met by its members should their names become public.
On this matter the Court stated, "[i]nviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensible to preserva-
tion of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dis-
sident beliefs.1 71  The Court required Alabama to show a subordinat-
ing and compelling interest in the membership list before infringement
of the N.A.A.C.P.'s associational rights could be justified, 72 a burden
the state was unable to satisfactorily meet.
Two years later, Bates v. Little Rock73 again brought before the
Supreme Court the question of requiring the N.A.A.C.P. to furnish a
list of its members to a governmental agency pursuant to a state stat-
ute placing a license tax on certain organizations and businesses.
Again, the Court refused to require divulgences of the membership list,
finding no connection between it and the expressed purpose of the
statute.
In 1963, the Court decided Gibson v. Florida Legislative Inves-
tigation Committee74 in which the Court's commitment to the right of
associational privacy was extended to infringements by investigative
bodies.75 There, the president of the Miami N.A.A.C.P. was called
to testify before a state legislative committee investigating Commu-
nism in Florida. The witness was asked to appear with a list of his
organization's members to which he could refer in determining whether
70. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
71. Id. at 462.
72. Id. at 463-64.
73. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
74. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
75. For other cases dealing with the clash between First Amendment rights and
the interests of an investigatory body, see DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S.
825 (1966); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States,
365 U.S. 399 (1961); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wat-
kins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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certain known Communists were members of the Miami N.A.A.C.P. 7r
Claiming infringement of associational privacy, the witness refused to
appear with the list but did testify without it, revealing that none of
the known Communists about whom he was interrogated were mem-
bers of his organization. Though the state court held him in con-
tempt, the Supreme Court failed to find "a substantial relation between
the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling
state interest"7 7 and upheld the witness's right not to produce the mem-
bership list.
The application of these principles to Bursey would place upon
the government the burden of showing a substantial relation between
members of the Black Panther Party and a possible plot to kill Presi-
dent Nixon. The government, however, was only able to show that
Hilliard had made an inflammatory speech at a very emotional anti-
war rally and that he asserted "we will kill Richard Nixon. 78, The
government made no showing that Hilliard was announcing Panther
policy or even that "Panther policy" had any binding effect on, or ex-
pressed the consensus of, the rank-and-file of the party." Therefore,
it would seem that an insufficient showing was made to allow the gov-
ernment what was in effect a means of obtaining the names of the
party's membership. Nevertheless, as will be seen, the Bursey court
refused to allow any further disclosures of the names of party mem-
bers on the grounds that the information solicited by the grand jury
was a clear invasion of freedom of the press. A discussion of the
questionable utility of this theory follows.
Freedom of the Press and Branzburg v. Hayes
In order for the government to invade the constitutional right of
freedom of the press, it was required by the Bursey court to make a
slightly different showing than that made with respect to freedom of
association. Essentially, the government had to show the existence of
a substantial possibility that the newspaper staff published and dis-
tributed the Hilliard speech with the intent to commit the crime of pres-
76. There is no indication that the membership list was to be used for any other
reason than as reference for the witness. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 582 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 546.
78. The government did introduce reports describing numerous violent confronta-
tions between Black Panthers and police and the convictions of various Panthers for
violent crimes in an attempt to establish a substantial relation between the Black
Panther Party and an assassination plot. However, the court rejected that out of
hand, saying, "It would not be hard to prove that registered Republicans and Demo-
crats have been charged with crimes of violence, but that fact would raise no infer-
ence that other members of the same parties were violent ....... Bursey v. United
States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1087 n.21 (9th Cir. 1972).
79. Id. at 1086.
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idential assassination." This required -the government to show not
only a substantial relation between Hilliard and the newspaper staff, but
also a substantial possibility of the existence of intent to carry out the
crime.
The more detailed showing required here to validate infringe-
ments into freedom of the press can be justified on the ground that
historically the Court has viewed such attempted infringements as inim-
ical and has dealt with them accordingly. Consequently, attempts
to require a publisher to put his name on his materials' or to require
a pamphleteer to be licensed82 have proved unsuccessful. Similarly,
cases dealing with statutes outlawing obscene literature,83 or creating
certain regulatory commissions over such literature,84 have also been
unsuccessful. The Bursey court, then, refused to require the witnesses
to answer the remainder of the questions because the government had
failed to demonstrate a substantial possibility of intent.
Nonetheless, despite these successes in the courtroom, the press
has suffered some failures. For example, it is strictly regulated in its
methods of reporting judicial proceedings, 5 is not privileged to gain
access to information not available to other citizens,86 and is not ex-
empt from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act.87 More-
over, it recently has been determined by the Supreme Court in Branz-
burg v. Hayes88 that newsmen have no privilege to refuse divulgence
of their sources' names to a grand jury. Branzburg, though dealing
exclusively with news gathering and not (as is the situation in Bur-
sey) with publishing and distributing," contains language which could
possibly be applied to reverse the Bursey decision or similar subse-
quent cases.
80. Id. at 1087.
81. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
82. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938); accord, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
83. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); accord, Burstyn v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
84. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
85. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); accord, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941); cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
86. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
87. Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
88. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
89. According to the court in Bursey, "[lwo basic ingredients of press freedom
are liberty to decide what to print and to distribute what is printed." Bursey v.
United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1972). In a footnote to that state-
ment, the court added, "[a] third element of the freedom of press, the freedom to
gather news, is not involved in this case." Id. at 1085 n.18.
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Essentially, Branzburg eliminated the concept of a newsman's
privilege9" to protect confidential sources in a good faith investigatory
proceeding. In such a proceeding, the newsman's rights are simply
those of an ordinary citizen subpoenaed to testify. 9  In noting the
impracticability of courts operating within a newsman's privilege, the
Court said:
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult
journey to such an uncertain destination. The administration of
a constitutional newsman's privilege would present practical and
conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would
be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified
for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the tradi-
tional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely
90. Actually, the existence of such a concept, outside of statute, is not recog-
nized by the vast majority of federal and state courts. The federal courts' position
on the privilege was established by Judge (now Justice) Stewart of the Second Circuit
in Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). In requiring that a columnist re-
veal the source of her article, the court said: "If an additional First Amendment
liberty-the freedom of the press-is here involved, we do not hesitate to conclude that
it too must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public interest in the
fair administration of justice." Id. at 549. This holding has been followed by the
majority of federal courts. E.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex.
1969); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957).
But see In re Lyons, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D.
351 (N.D. Ala. 1953) (involving a state shield statute).
The bulk of the cases on this question have been in state courts, and decisions
have been overwhelmingly against the recognition of the privilege. In State v.
Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court, in denying
the privilege to a university newspaper reporter said, "it would be difficult to ration-
alize a rule that would create special constitutional rights for those possessing creden-
tials as news gatherers which would not conflict with the equal-privileges and equal-
protection concepts also found in the Constitution." Id. at 248-249, 436 P.2d at 731.
Other state court cases reaching like results are: In re Wolf, 69 Misc. 2d 256,
329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1972); State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93
(1971); Beecroft v Point Pleasant Printing & Publishing Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197
A.2d 416 (Super. Ct. 1964) (involving interpretation of a shield statute); In re
Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla.
1950); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); Joslyn
v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011
(Sup. Ct. 1913); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Ex parte
Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S.E. 320
(1887); People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 9 N.Y. (2 Hun.) 226 (1874). But see In re
Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963) (state's shield statute protected reporter).
For an analysis of the arguments favoring a newsman's privilege see Guest & Stanzler,
The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L.
REV. 18 (1969). For a general look at state shield statutes, see Note, Reporters and
Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J.
317 (1970).
91. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
pamphleteer . ..just as much as of the large metropolitan pub-
lisher .... 92
The effect of this decision on the "substantial relation" doctrine,
partially employed by the Bursey court, was illustrated by the Court.
Caldwell v. United States,9" one of the cases brought to the Supreme
Court under the Branzburg title, was a Ninth Circuit case involving
a New York Times reporter. Caldwell had refused to divulge infor-
mation gained in interviews with Black Panthers to a grand jury inves-
tigating a possible plot to assassinate President Nixon. Explaining
the effect of the substantial relation doctrine, as modified by Branz-
burg, the Court said:
[It is quite apparent (1) that the State has the necessary inter-
est . . in forestalling assassination attempts on the President...
and (2) that, based on the stories . . .Caldwell wrote . . . the
grand jury called [him] as they would others-because it was
likely that [he] could supply information to help the Govern-
ment determinie whether illegal conduct had occurred and, if it
had, whether there was sufficient evidence to return an indict-
ment.9 4
The test in Bursey not only employed the substantial relation doc-
trine but added to it a further requirement of intent. The facility with
which Branzburg appears to pierce the substantial relation doctrine
as it applies to reporters has ominous implications as to that same
doctrine as it applies to publishing and distributing, especially where
a showing of intent is also required. 95 Application of Branzburg might
weaken Bursey for example on the grounds that those on the news-
paper's staff were so closely connected with the Black Panther Party
that they might reasonably be expected to have information relating
to an assassination plot. To this extent then, it appears that Bursey's
reliance on freedom of the press to deny the Government access to
92. Id. at 703-04.
93. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). In addition to Caldwell, two other cases
were included in the Branzburg decision. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. Sup.
Ct. 1971) and Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
94. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972).
95. A further indication that Branzburg might adversely affect cases similar to
Bursey is seen in the emphasis Bursey places on distinguishing the government's
compelling interest in the subject matter of the investigation with its compelling
interest in the subject matter of each disputed question. The Bursey court said:
' The fact alone that the Government has a compelling interest in the subject matter
of a grand jury investigation does not establish that it has any compelling need for
the answers to any specific questions." 466 F.2d at 1086. On the other hand,
Branzburg makes no reference to requiring a compelling interest in the subject matter
of each question. Indeed, as seen in text cited at note 94 supra, the Court seems
ready to require only a very general showing by the government that it has a com-
pelling interest in the subject matter of the investigation.
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information about the Black Panther Newspaper may no longer be ef-
fective. 96
On the other hand, Branzburg's dilution of the freedom of asso-
ciation doctrine is less clear. There are several Supreme Court cases on
the right of associational privacy vis-a-vis investigative bodies97 and,
to a qualified extent, 98 establishing the predominance of that right over
the needs of the investigative bodies. In contrast, there have been
numerous cases rejecting the predominance of freedom of the press
in both state and federal investigatory proceedings.99 For these rea-
sons, the constitutional privilege of freedom of association currently
appears to be on firmer ground than the privilege, often analogous,
concerning freedom of the press. It is therefore probable that the doc-
trine of associational privacy would serve as a more persuasive basis
for the Bursey decision than the grounds actually employed.
Conclusion
The validity of the foregoing discussion concerning First Amend-
96. It is, of course, impossible to make a valid prediction on this point.
Anyone who would hazard a guess as to what the Supreme Court will do with a
case similar to Bursey in the wake of Branzburg builds his house upon a foundation of
sand. The recent history of the Supreme Court provides ample supportive evidence.
Compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971) (dealing with the rights of illegitimate children to inherit as legitimate chil-
dren); compare Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) with Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (dealing with federal court intervention into state court proceed-
ings). The author, therefore, offers these inferences with the appropriate caveat.
97. See note 75 supra.
98. The qualification lies in those cases where investigations of the Communist
Party had raised the spectre of First Amendment infringements. See, e.g., Braden v.
United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). The United States Supreme Court
showed less solicitude for appellants in these cases than for those where so-called
legitimate (as distinct from "subversive") organizations were being harrassed. It ap-
pears that the decisions allowing infringements of associational privacy in the Com-
munist Party cases should not be allowed to dilute the holdings disallowing such in-
fringements in other types of associational privacy cases, especially in light of Mr.
Justice Goldberg's majority opinion in Gibson v. Forida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963): "Applying these principles to the facts of this case,
the respondent Committee contends that the prior decisions of this Court [citations
omitted] compel a result here upholding the legislative right of inquiry. In Barenblatt,
Wilkinson, and Braden, however, it was a refusal to answer a question or questions
concerning the witness' own past or present membership in the Communist Party
which supported his conviction. It is apparent that the necessary preponderating gov-
ernmental interest and, in fact, the very result in those cases were founded on the
holding that the Communist Party is not an ordinary or legitimate political party, as
known in this country, and that, because of its particular nature, membership therein
is itself a permissible subject of regulation and legislative scrutiny." Id. at 547.
99. See cases cited in note 90 supra.
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ment rights will depend upon the extent to which the Supreme Court
applies the broad language of Branzburg. Determination of this point
may rest squarely on the shoulders of Mr. Justice Powell, who, in the
five to four decision, wrote the concurring opinion which may prove
to have a moderating effect upon future Supreme Court decisions in
this field. Mr. Justice Powell wrote at one point in his concurrence:
Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bear-
ing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the
investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his
testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a
legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the
Court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order
may be entered.' 00
Although this statement indicates Justice Powell's predilection to-
ward the newsman's First Amendment rights, it still leaves in doubt
just how "substantial" a "relation" must exist between the subject mat-
ter of a grand jury's investigation and the information it seeks to elicit
before a newsman will be required to breach his confidences. The de-
gree to which Branzburg has modified this "substantial relation" doc-
trine will affect its application to analogous cases like Bursey.
It has been suggested in this note that the language in Branzburg
could affect the Bursey decision adversely to witnesses Bursey and
Presley. This analysis was predicated upon the fact that no definitive
decisions have been made by the Supreme Court establishing the dom-
inance of freedom of the press where it clashes with investigative
bodies.' 0' It must further be based on the solicitude shown by the
Court in the past to grand jury powers.'0 2 In denying a petition for
100. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
101. See note 75 supra.
102. The extent of the power allowed a grand jury is a subject on which much
has been written. Generally, the following principles have been established concerning
grand jury procedures: witnesses subpoenaed need not be informed as to whom or
what the grand jury is investigating (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906)); wit-
nesses cannot object to irrelevancy of questions or challenge the authority of the
grand jury (Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) ); a court cannot restrict
the scope of inquiry of the grand jury (Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919));
a witness has no right to have counsel present in the grand jury chambers (In re
Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1956) (dealing with a fire marshall's investigation) ); the
grand jury's proceedings are kept secret (In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283
(E.D. Pa. 1933) ); and witnesses' First Amendment rights are severely restricted
(see cases cited in note 60 supra). Contra, Evans v. United States, 452 F.2d 1239
(D.C. Cir. 1971); in re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pa., 450 F.2d 199 (3d
Cir. 1971) (Fourth Amendment objections by witnesses upheld); see In re Russo, 53
F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (dictum). A number of articles have explored the sub-
ject. E.g., Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J.
153 (1965); Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARsu. J.
PRAC. & PROC. 18 (1967); Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury,
April 19731
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
rehearing of the Bursey case, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals said:
Although there is some language in Mr. Justice White's opinion
in Branzburg . . . implying that a grand jury investigation car-
ries with it ingredients that may favor balance for the Government
as against the First Amendment, the passage does not purport to
disavow the balancing standards enunciated in such cases as De-
Gregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire .... 103
Despite this optimism, however, the validity of the substantial re-
lation doctrine is very much in question not only as to newsmen and
their sources, but also as to all areas included in freedom of the press
and freedom of association. Until Congress establishes definite
guidelines in this area or until the case law becomes more extensive,
this uncertainty will continue to reign.
Thomas F. Schroeter*
1967 DUKE L.J. 97; Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARv. L. REV.
590 (1961).
103. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1091 (9th Cir. 1972) (opinion on
petition for rehearing).
* Member, Second Year Class
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